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IN THE SUPRE,ME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LESTER A. JONES, d/b/a ENGINE 
& AIR SERVICE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
0. C. ALLEN, d/b/a 0. C. ALLEN 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8709 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Plaintiff and respondent, Lester A. Jones, is unable 
to accept as f.air, accurate and complete the statement of 
facts set forth in the brief of the defendant and appellant 
and will therefore restate said facts as plaintiff and 
respondent views the same. 
Throughout this brief the parties will be referred to 
as in the Trial Court; plaintiff and respondent being 
referred to as plaintiff; defendant and appellant as 
defendant. All italics are ours. 
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2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appeal of defendant is fron1 judgment of the 
Trial Court which was entered after the jury had re-
turned a special verdict. The special verdict contained 
six groups of propositions. Based on the special verdict 
a judg1nent was entered in plaintiffs favor and against 
defendant. 
Group one presented to the jury the follo-wing two 
propositions: 
"Proposition (a) The defendant sold to plain-
tiff two barrels of oil other than 200 Kendall SAE 
140. 
"PropositioD (b) The oil sold to plaintiff in 
1955 was 200 Kendall SAE 140." 
The jury answered the proposition (a) in the affir1native. 
There is no dispute that the defendant intenC.ed to 
deliver l(endall 200 SAE 1±0 gear lubricant. The e:~hibits 
D ant110 show the intended order and the representations 
h:~ the 0. C. Allen Company concerning what was being 
delivered. 
~l,lwrc doe8 not sec1n to be any serion~ disputes but 
·what all parties to the hro ~all'~. one on the 6th of X ovem-
her, 1 !l!lG and the other one on the 14th of December, 
1 !l:lG, intended thl' oil sold and rcet'in'd to be 200 Kendall 
SA 1~} l·t-0 oil. 
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3 
The evidence concerning the kind of oil which was 
actually delivered by defendant to plaintiff is disputed 
but evidence w.as presented which is of a substantial 
nature and which directly supports the jury's answer to 
proposition (a). 1\Ir. George Petty was sworn and testi-
fied as an expert and tested a part of the oil delivered 
to plaintiff. His testirnony is that the oil delivered was 
the equivalent of SAE 40 rather than 140. In addition 
to the evidence of Petty Exhibit 11 shows that the test 
done on the oil by Kendall Refining Company at the 
request of the defendant revealed that the sample sent 
was not representative of 200 Kendall SAE 140 oil. See 
Exhibit 11 and (R. 15). 
Group two of the interrogatories submitted two 
propositions to the jury to detennine. The propositions 
were as follows : 
"Proposition (a) The plaintiff used the said 
oil in the two trucks referred to as R 190 and R 
191 in reliance on the representation of the de-
fendant that it was 200 Kendall SAE 140. 
"Proposition (b) The plaintiff used the said 
oil in the said trucks without reliance on the de-
fendant's representations that it was 200 Kendall 
SAE 140." 
The jury answered the proposition (a) in the affirm.a tive. 
In addition to the representations appearing on the 
oil barrel itself and those made by the delivery tickets, 
at the time the oil was delivered the driver of the de-
fendant's oil delivery truck specifically represented that 
this was 200 Kendall SAE 140 oil, (R 40). 
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Group 3 of the interrogatories presented two propo-
sitions which read as follows : 
"Proposition (a) The use of said oil caused 
damage to the said trucks. 
"Proposition (b) The said oil did not cause 
any dmnage to the said truck." 
Again the jury answered the proposition (a) 1n the 
affirmative. 
The evidence concerning the damage to the truck 
indicated that the first two trucks in which the oil furn-
ished by defendant was used were placed on the job; 
that both of said trucks were damaged. As soon as 
damage was discovered the other trucks in which the oil 
was used were brought in immediately and a new supply 
of oil placed in said truck. In addition to the evidence 
showing the damage to the trucks the plaintiff testifying 
as an expert and experienced repair man described the 
kind of da1nage as damage resulting from failure of the 
lubricant whieh had been placed in the gear mechanisms 
of the trucks (R. 48-49). 
Group 4 of the speeial verdict presented two proposi-
tions for the jtu~· to eonsider. They read as follows: 
"Proposition (a) Under all of the eonditions 
~·mrrounding the sale and purchase of the said 
oil, an ordinary, prudent truek repairman would 
not havp relied on the said oil as being 200 Ken-
dall SAE 140. 
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''Proposition (b) Under all of the conditions 
surrounding the sale and purchase of the said oil, 
an ordinary prudent truck repairman would have 
relied on the said oil as being 200 Kendall SAl:~ 
140." 
The jlu~· answered group -l proposition~ as proposition 
(b) in the affirn1ative. 
The pleadings in the t·a~e show that the defendant 
denied that the oil delivered wa::; not l(endall :200 ~~.AE 
140 gear lubricant. The answer further denied that the 
plaintiff relied upon the warranties and representations 
b~· defendant that the oil delivered was Kendall :ZOO SAE 
140. K o amendment to the answer was ever made but 
at the time of the request for instructions submitted by 
the defendant he requested an instn1etion numbered No.3 
shown on page 151 of the record. It requested the Court 
to instruct the jury that if the plaintiff examined the oil 
or lubricant delivered to him and from such examination 
he determined or should have determined that the oil or 
lubricant was not the type that he had ordered then there 
is no implied warranty and a verdict should be in favor 
of defendant and against plaintiff for no cause of action. 
At no place in the pleadings or in the instructions 
did the defendant squarely present the defense that plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent and that an ordinar:;, 
prudent truck repairman would not have relied upon the 
representations of the defendant that the oil delivered 
was 200 Kendall SAE 140. The Court however submitted 
the question to the jury and on the proposition the jury 
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answered that a prudent truck repairman would have 
relied upon it being the kind of oil that it was repre-
sented to be on the barrel and by the invoices and de-
livery slips. 
Group 5 of the special verdict contained two propo-
sitions which read as follows: 
"Proposition (a) The said damage to the 
trucks would have occurred with the use of 200 
Kendall SAE 140 oil. 
"Proposition (b) The said damage would not 
have occurred to the said trucks with the use of 
200 Kendall SAE 140 oil." 
The jury answered the propo.sition that the damage that 
occurred to the trucks would not have occurred had the 
oil furnished by defendant been :200 Kendall SAE 140 oil. 
The evidence supporting this finding was the expert 
testinwny of the plaintiff and a nu1nber of pamphlets 
both supplied by plaintiff and supplied by the defendant. 
Exhibit 8 was a che1nical lubrication 1nanual put out by 
J(endall Refining C01npany, one of the exhibits furnished 
hy defendant. Exhibit 11 likewise was infonnation fur-
nished hy l{endall Refining C01npany. It was a report to 
defendant showing the results of .a test which the Kendall 
Hefining Company conducted on a sample of the oil fur-
nished to it by defendant. The oil cmne fr01n the rear 
end of the trucks which were lubricated by plaintiff. 
The matter was considerably disputed. The evidence 
\\'ouJd ~upport a finding on the plaintiff's testilnony 
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alone that the Kendall 200 SAE 140 oil was .an oil which 
would satisfactorily lubricate the kind of truck rear ends 
into which it was placed. 
The last group of the special verdict submitted to 
the jury was on the an1ount of damages suffered and 
apparently defendant has no objection to the amount of 
the verdict or the 1nanner of said question being sub-
mitted to the jury. 
The testi1nony of plaintiff revealed that over a long 
period of time he had purchased from defendant Kendall 
200 SAE 140 gear lubricant and that on prior occasions 
he had requested the oil to be delivered in 100 pound 
cans. That on occasion in the past the oil had been placed 
in .said cans by defendant out of larger barrels which he 
had at his place of business. 
The oil can itself was an exhibit before the jury. 
It was carefully examined and viewed by all of the par-
ties, the Court and the jury. 
There was no seal on the can. Defendant would lead 
the Court to believe that the can was a sealed container. 
Not so. It was an ordinary type c.an with a crimped edge, 
the crimps around the edge being of the kind which could 
be opened with a pair of pliers and closed in the same 
manner. There was no other kind of seal which could not 
be removed and replaced by any person who had the 
occasion to do so without leaving any sign of his activity. 
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Contrary to the statement contained in defendant's 
brief, defendant testified that he could not say who had 
handled the barrel of oil while it was in his possession 
or how long it had been there. (R. 133 and 134) 
The record also reveals that the defendant was in the 
business of reprocessing oil, re-refining oil and that he 
acts as a wholesaler of such oil. (R. 127) 
Defendant would not deny that at his place of busi-
ness he had on occasion filled these kind of cans which 
had been delivered to plaintiff and represented to contain 
l{endall 200 SAE 140 gear lubricant. (R. 128) 
A sample of the oil which was in the rear end of the 
trucks repaired by plaintiff was furnished by plaintiff 
to defendant. Defendant then sub1nitted the sample oil 
to the Kendall Refining Cmnpany. A report on the sub-
mitted oil w.as 1nade to defendant and becan1e Exhibit 11. 
The report as far as material to the present appeal states 
as follows: 
"This is in follow-up of ~Ir. Osborne's letter 
to you of February 10. \Ye receiYed the sample 
of gear lubricant, taken frmn one of the Eaton, 
1nodel :28.M, dual, double reduction rear axle .as-
senlblies frmn an unit owned and operated by The 
Air & Eng-ine ~erYire Cmnpany. 
''Our laboratory report, nu1nber 3(ll3G, found 
the gear lube smnple to be an SAE 90 EP Gear 
Lubricant with a viscositY index of onlY 89.6. In 
other word:-;, the san1ple ~ub1nitted to ~s was not 
rr>presentatiYP of Kendall No. 200 Gear Lube, 
whieh had been reported as having been used in 
the above n1entioned rear axle.'' 
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Exhibit 1~ is a C'opy of the letter forwarded hy de-
fendant to l(endall Refining Company requesting a test-
ing of the sample of lubricant submitted to Kendall. 
At the ti1ne of trial defendant did not disavow the 
letter. It was identified by defendant and was submitted 
for the jury's consideration. 
Sl'l\C\fARY OF ARGU~IENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS PROPERLY PLACED 
THE BURDEN OF PROVING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE UPON DEFENDANT. 
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
CONCERNING THE WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABLE 
QUALITY. 
POINT III 
EXHIBIT NO. 11 WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AND IS 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHI·CH COULD BE CON-
SIDERED BY THE JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS PROPERLY PLACED 
THE BURDEN OF PROVING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE UPON DEFENDANT. 
The Court in Instruction No. 2 placed upon plaintiff 
the burden of proving the truth of the propositions letter 
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(a) in groups 1, 2 and 3 of the special verdict. It required 
plaintiff to prove, first, that the defendant sold to plain-
tiff oil which was not 200 Kendall SAE 140. Second, that 
the plaintiff used the oil furnished in reliance on the 
representations of defendant that it was 200 Kendall SAE 
140. Third, that the oil was the cause of damage to the 
trucks in which it was used. 
These three propositions are the basic and funda-
Inental issues of plaintiff's cause of action. The Court, by 
instruction X o. 2, required defendant to prove the af-
firmative propositions lettered (a) groups 4 and 5. These 
propositions required that he prove that under the con-
ditions of sale and purchase of the oil an ordinarily pru-
dent truck repairman would not have relied on the oil as 
being 200 Kendall SAE 140. This defense would be a de-
fense of contributory negligence. It would seen1 clear 
that the burden of proving contributory negligence as in 
all case of tort liability, would be upon the defendant. If 
an ordinarily prudent truck repainnan would not have 
relied upon the representations and warranty then plain-
tiff would have been negligent. 
Proposition 5 was that the da1nage to the trucks 
would have occurred even had the oil used been 200 l{en-
dall SA I·~ 1-t-0 oil. The burden of proving this propo-
:-;ition "·a~ likewi8e placed upon the defendant. 
The .argument of defendant as contained on pages 
9, 10, 11 and 12 of his brief seem to go to a basic factual 
propo:-;ition. He argues that reliance must be established 
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by evidence. vVith this plaintiff has no argument. The 
Court placed the burden of proving reliance on plaintiff, 
and the burden of showing unreasonableness of such 
reliance on defendant. The evidence is substantial. The 
arguments are resolved by the jury rendering its ver-
dict upon the preponderance of the evidence as it viewed 
it. Witness Petty, an expert on testing of oil stated he 
could not, hy looking at the oil tell its SAE equivalent. 
(R. 20) 
The defense is that no reasonably prudent person 
would have believed that the oil furnished was X o. 200 
Kendall SAE 140 oil. That plaintiff, in relying upon 
the representation that it was such oil was acting as an 
unreasonable person. Defendant did not plead contri-
butory negligence. He denied that the plaintiff relied 
upon their representation that the oil furnished \\'a~ X o. 
200 Kendall SAE 140. 
Throughout the trial, without objection, evidence was 
received and the instruction was given concerning con-
tributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The 
burden of proving it was upon the defendant. Defendant 
seemed to .admit that if he pleaded contributory negli-
gence he would have the burden of proving it. Certainly 
the permitting of such defense though not pleaded should 
not now be claimed by defendant as a way to shift the 
burden of proving freedom from contributory negligence 
to plain tiff. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
CONCERNING THE WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABLE 
QUALITY. 
As plaintiff analyses the position of defendant con-
cerning the warranty, it is to the effect that since the oil 
'vas delivered in a container which defendant claims was 
a sealed container there was no warranty. 
The law of Utah seerns to be clear that the kind of 
lid which was on the can in which the oil was delivered, 
namely, a crirnped edge lid with the crirnps fitting into the 
corresponding indentations on the can, does not, as that 
terrn is used in sales law, create nor constitute a sealed 
container. Jordan v. Coke Cola Bottling Company of 
Utah, 117 Utah 578, 218 P. 2d 660. 
The provisions of the sales act under which plaintiff 
views his clairn is 61-1-15 ( 2). It reads as follows: 
"\Yhere the goods are bought by description 
frorn a seller who deals in goods of that descrip-
tion (whether he is the grower or rnanufacturer or 
not), there is an irnplied warranty that the goods 
shall be of merchantable quality.·· 
The provision of the sales act has been considered 
at great length h~, the authorities since the uniform sales 
act was adopted. It has been generally recognized that 
the quoted portion, as far as liability for the sale of 
good~ whieh were not of rnerchantable quality is con-
<'Prned, ha~ abolished the distinction between a dealer and 
a manufaehtrPr of the goods sold. 
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.Merchantable quality has been described as bein:s 
at least aver.age quality. It has been said that it mean" 
that the goods sold are of the general kind described and 
reasonably fit for the general purpose for ·which it shall 
have been sold. Giant J/({}mfact~trin/J Co. v. rates .Ameri-
can Jlaclz iue·ry Co., 111 Fed. 2d 3GO. Botti v. F enice 
Grocery Co., 309 ~las~. -±50, :~3 .:\E :2cl-±91, 135 ALR 1387. 
S]JPIT.1f Flo·ur Co. v. De;1!oss, 11-± Or. 4-W, 18 P. :Z(l :2-±:2, 
90 ALR 406. 
There could be no doubt that a warranty of Inerchant-
ahilit:- would require of the seller that the goods actu-
ally be those which were ordered by the huyer. In the 
present case it is demonstrated that the oil furnished 
was not Kendall 200 SAE 140 oil. Certainly .a warranty 
of merchantability would require that the seller supply 
the actual kind of oil ordered and not just that oil be 
furnished which is branded as the oil ordered. 
Probably the leading authority concerning this mat-
ter in the State of rtah is TVri,r;ht r. llozrell, -t-6 rtah 3SS, 
150 Pac. 956. In the case the lm~-er requested raw lin-
seed oil and the seller furnished instead boiled lin~wed 
oil. It was held that the seller was responsiblP for the 
death of the horses to which the boiled linseed oil wa~ 
administered. 
The most recent Utah case discussing the matter of 
warranty is vVasatch Chemical Co. v. Lerm, ______ Utah 
______ , 259 Pac. 2d 301, at 303. See also Thatcher Jlf i11i ll.rJ 
Elevator Co. v. Cambell, 64 Utah -1-22, 231 Pac. G21. 
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It appears that under Utah decisions the container 
was not a sealed container and even if it were so a war-
ranty would still exi~t in favor of the buyer that the 
goods delivered in a sealed container were of merchant-
able quality, i.e., that they were actually the goods which 
the seller ordered and which the brand or description on 
the container described. 
POINT III 
EXHIBIT NO. 11 WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AND IS 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHICH COULD BE CON-
SIDERED BY THE JURY. 
The general rule cited by the evidence text writers is 
to the effect that letter received or written by a party 
to a law suit may be received as competent evidence. 
Such documents are received as admissions against in-
terest or adoptive admission. When a party to a law 
suit has received a letter, retained it, acted upon it, fur-
nished copies of it to other persons, or has requested the 
writer to make the report. The receipt, possession, reli-
ance upon and use of such letters is Yiewed as an acquies-
ence in the letters content. 
For a discussion of such rules see Jones. On Evi-
dence. \'olu1ne 1. Section 269, Page 504. 
The te~t imony of 0. C. Allen rev-ealed that he had 
n~<'eiverl I~xhihit No. 11. It "·as written to hiln as a re-
:-;nlt of a n•<pw~t h~· hiln for a test of the oil furnished. 
Jlp rPlie<l upon it anrl.a<'qniPsce in its content. He did not 
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make any kind of a protest to the l{:endall people, did 
not make any clain1 that the content of the letter was not 
accurate or that the test did not reveal a true condition 
as far ,as the oil is concerned. 
The exhibit is material on the question of merchant-
ability. Defendant was required to furnish plaintiff only 
oil representative of Kendall 200 SAE 140 oil. The Ken-
dall letter shows that the oil was not a representative 
sample of I\::endall No. 200 SAE 140 oil. 
The Eniforrn Rules of Evidence approved by the 
American Bar Association and adopted as a Preliminary 
Draft by the Utah State Bar Commission sets down the 
rule contended for by plaintiff in the following language, 
Rule 62 He.arsay Evidence Sub-rule 8: 
"A 1dhorized and Ado }Jtive Admissions. "'\-, 
against a party, a stateinent (a) by a person au-
thorized by the part~~ to n1ake a statement or state-
ments for him concerning the subject of the state-
ment, or (b) of which the party with knowledge of 
the content thereof has, b~r words or other condurt, 
manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth.'' 
The basic proposition which plaintiff contends for 
is discussed at great length by Wigmore in his work on 
evidence. See Wigmore on Evidence, Volume+, Section 
1073, Page 89. The basic rule as set forth rPa(ls as fol-
lows: 
"The written statements of a third person 
may be so dealt with by the party that his assent 
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to the correctness of the statements may be in-
ferred, and they would thus by adoption become 
his own statements." 
Wigmore discusses the docurnents which have been 
received in many cases as admissions against the party 
to whom they were addressed under the following basic 
classifications : ( 1) Documents seen. ( 2) Documents 
found in possession; ( 3) Documents of demand received 
hut not answered; and ( 4) Documents made use of. The 
discussion under the fourth category, namely, documents 
1nade use of, seems to be rnost clearly applicable to the 
discussion found current in this Court. The general rule 
under four is as follows: 
"The parties use of a document rnade by .a 
third person will frequently amount to a approval 
of its statements as correct and thus it n1ay be 
received against him as an admission by adop-
tion." p. 97. 
In JJfonsos v. Eiler, et al., 216 'Yis. 133, 256 X.,Y. 630 
the receipt by the trial court of an unsigned carbon of a 
letter frmu an insurance agency written to the insurance 
agent of the plaintiff was approved. The insurance 
agent sent a ropy of this letter to the defendant. The 
defendant took the letter .and delivered it to the plaintiff. 
'T'he IC'ttPr contained a statement that the defendant felt 
very had about the happening of the accident and felt 
that he wa.s to blaine sinre he had invited the plaintiff 
to ride with hiln. The 'Visconsin Court held that the 
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delivery of the unsigned copy of the letter by the de-
fendant to the plaintiff, without repudiation of its con-
tent, constitute an adoption of the contents of the letter. 
In Wieder v. Lorenz, 164 Or. 10, 99 Pac. 2d 38, the 
Oregon Suprmne Court upheld the Trial Court in permit-
ting a letter from defendant's bank. The bank was not 
a party nor did not appear to be the agent of the defend-
ant for the purpose of communicating or writing a letter, 
however, the letter was written to the defendant and in 
it there was discussed certain logs which were referred 
to as the property of the defendant. Inquiries were made 
concerning the .sale or use of the proceeds from the logs. 
The Court held that the receipt of the letter and its reten-
tion without repudiating the truth of the content therein 
and without stating that what was set forth therein was 
not a fact constituted an admission by the defendant that 
the bank had a correct understanding of the ownership 
of the property which it wrote about. This case is an 
example of a party dealing with written instruments of a 
third person in such a way as to show that he adopted 
the document and acquiesed in the contents. 
In People v. Burgess, 244 N.Y. 472, 155 N.E. 7--l-fl, the 
New York Appellate Court held that the receipt of audi-
tors report without the auditor who prepared them testi-
fying was proper as an admission by the defendant where 
counsel for the defendant had submitted the .auditor';.;; 
report to the Grand Jury at a time when defendant's case 
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was being considered by the Grand Jury. This case is 
another exarnple of the third party statement being so 
used, handled or relied upon as to constitute an admission. 
One of the most interesting cases is Cameron v. Cam-
eron, 232 N".C. 686, 61 S.E. 2d 913. This was a divorce 
action and there were certain letters received as evidence 
against the party to whom they were written. The letters 
were found in the private desk of the party and contained 
compromising state1nents from persons to whom the lady 
had been writing. The Court held that the retention by 
the party of the letters fron1 the third party and her 
claim to said letters constituted an assent to the content 
and acquiescence in the content of the letter. As a con-
sequence the letters were admissible evidence in the di-
vorce action to show that she was guilty of misconduct 
and breach of her marital vows. 
In Commonworth v. Fusci, 153 Pa. Super 617, 35 Atl. 
2d 93, p. 96 the rules set forth in Wigmore are specifically 
approved, the case concerned a letter received but not 
replied to and acted upon. The Court held that the re-
eipient of the letter had adopted and approved its con-
tent. 
Exhibit 11 w.a~ a response to an inquiry and request 
for tlw testing utade hy the defendant and in making the 
h\st and reporting its results l{endall acted for defendant. 
'1-,he Pxhihi t di reetl~· statf'~ that the l{endall Oil Com pan~~ 
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was not responsible for that oil because it was not their 
brand of oil and w.as not representative of their 200 SAE 
140 oil. 
If the defendant disbelieved the letter should such 
a statement b:, I{endall go unchallenged~ There would 
logically have been smne response to Kendall's statement 
if it were not conceded to be true. The explanation for 
his failure to respond would lie in defendant 'f-; mouth. 
If he desired to explain the letter or to show what he had 
done in response to it other than deliver a copy to the 
plaintiff he should have come forward with such evidence. 
If his counsel desired to have the use of the letters by the 
jury controlled to request an instruction concerning its 
request was his responsibility. 
In Yolume 20, American J urisprudencr .at page 481 
and 482 there is n discussion of the evidentiary rule un-
der topic heading ··l~ailure to Answer vVritten Communi-
cation" and under the heading "Silence Re~;l>etting Acci-
dent." Both of these sections discuss the rules which 
we have cited to the Court in Wigmore and Jones under 
the heading "Tacit Admission hy a Party." 
The closest case which counsel for plaintiff has been 
aLlr~ to discover in the State o;· Utah is the State v. 
Greene) 38 Utah 389, 115 Pac. 181. In the Green case 
there was an affidavit by the prosecuting witness. The 
affidavit was received to show .admissions by the defend-
ant of a pnrt of the affidavit. It was admitted over thP 
objection that the affidavit was hearsay. Defendant had 
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been exmnined concerning statements in the affidavit of 
the prosecuting witne.ss by the county attorney and his 
reaction and admission that certain of the statements 
made in the affidavit were true constituted the grounds 
for its admission even though hearsay. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Exhibit 11 was 
properly received as evidence in the above entitled action. 
Certainly the conduct of the defendant regarding the 
exhibit showed tacit admission, acquiescence in, and adop-
tion of the report which he had requested from the Ken-
dall Oil Company and which was made for him by the 
company. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully sub1nitted that the Court did not 
error in its instructions; that it did not error in the re~ 
ception of the evidence received. The verdict of the jury 
is supported by substantial evidence and the amount 
awarded plaintiff is a fair sun1 for the damages suffered. 
This Court should therefore affirn1 the judg1nent of tlw 
Lower Court. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
KING AND HUGHES 
By Dwight L. I~ing 
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